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Farm Balance Sheets: The Hidden Risk of  
Non-Real Estate Debt
by Brian Briggeman, Economist
Today’s soaring farmland values 
have boosted farm wealth and driven 
the U.S. farm balance sheet to its 
strongest level since the 1970s farm 
boom. In fact, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) projects 2011 
real farm equity to surpass the record 
highs of the 1970s. Since farmland is 
the largest asset on a farm balance sheet, 
rising land prices have pushed U.S. 
farm debt-to-asset ratios to record lows.   
While the industry’s overall debt-
to-asset ratio is low, some producers 
have much higher debt-to-asset ratios. 
In many cases, these producers have 
more elevated levels of non-real estate 
farm debt. If farmland values were to 
fall sharply, as they did in the farm 
crisis of the 1980s, both farm balance 
sheets and farm wealth would suffer, 
especially for farmers with high levels 
of non-real estate debt.
This article explores the effects of 
falling farmland values on farm balance 
sheets, wealth and insolvency. The 
analysis finds that most producers with 
a high risk of insolvency tend to carry 
significant levels of non-real estate debt. 
Further, most of the operations in this 
high-risk group tend to be large, with 
more than $1 million in farm sales—
or they tend to be operated by farmers 
under the age of 35. Echoing the 1980s 
farm debt crisis, producers with higher 
levels of non-real estate debt would face 
the greatest risks to farm bankruptcy if 
land values fell sharply.
Farm sector Balance sheets  
Strong farmland values have 
bolstered today’s farm balance sheets. 
During the last decade, gains in farm 
asset values, led by farmland, have 
outpaced rising farm debt levels.  The 
result has been a 45 percent surge in 
farm wealth—a windfall similar to that 
of the farm boom of the 1970s (Chart 
1). In addition, rising net worth levels 
for farmers have helped push debt-
to-asset ratios to record lows, thus 
reducing the risk of insolvency.
Farm assets, in particular farmland 
values, drive shifts in farm wealth. 
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Chart 1
Farm Sector Net Worth
Chart 2
Farm Sector Real Estate and Non-Real 
Estate Debt
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture


















































































Farm Non-Real Estate Debt  Farm Real Estate Debt 
Farmland represents about 80 
percent of a farm’s total net worth. When 
land values surge, as in the 1970s and 
2000s, so does net worth. Conversely, if 
farmland values crash, as in the 1980s, 
net worth plummets.  
Non-real estate asset values, in 
contrast, have a smaller effect on farm net 
worth. Since 1960, non-real estate assets, 
such as grain and livestock inventories, 
machinery and equipment, have changed 
only slightly in value, largely because 
many such assets are depreciable. 
Farm debt, which is evenly split 
between real estate and non-real estate 
debt, may dampen farm net worth. 
During the 1970s, both farm real estate 
and non-real estate debt rose sharply as 
farmers financed a large portion of their 
farmland, machinery, equipment and 
other non-real estate purchases with 
debt (Chart 2). During the last decade, 
however, farm real estate and non-real 
estate debt rose more slowly, 25 percent 
and 10 percent respectively.
In addition to affecting net worth, 
changing asset and debt levels also 
influence leverage ratios and the risk of 
insolvency. During the 1970s, farmers 
accumulated debt on par with asset 
values, and the farm leverage or debt-to-
asset ratio held steady at 15 percent. In 
contrast, during the past decade, the farm 
sector’s more modest debt accumulation 
has allowed the debt-to-asset ratio to fall 
to historical lows of less than 10 percent 
in recent years. The primary difference between 
debt accumulation today and during 
the 1970s is non-real estate debt. 
The growth of non-real estate debt in 
the 1970s was nine times that of the 
2000s. During the farm crisis of the 
1980s, inability to service non-real 
estate debt obligations was a major 
contributor to the insolvency of many 
U.S. farms and ranches (Harl).1
Farm Balance sheet strength
While the national farm balance 
sheet is quite strong today, some 
agricultural producers have high debt 
levels and weaker balance sheets. 
For example, today’s farm debt is 
concentrated among a third of all 
producers who account for 70 percent 
of U.S. agricultural production. 
Given this concentration, the average 
indebted producer’s debt-to-asset ratio 
is three times greater than the ratio for 
the farm sector as a whole (Chart 3). 
Among these producers with debt, the 
most indebted have higher levels of 
non-real estate debt, which varies by 
farm size and operator age. 
Of producers with debt, large 
farming operations with more than 
$1 million in farm sales are wealthier, 
but they are more leveraged than their 
smaller counterparts. On average, large 
farms’ total net worth is more than 5 
times the net worth of small farms, 
primarily due to a larger investment 
in non-real estate assets (Chart 4). 
Still, large farming operations are 
more leveraged. On average, large 
farms’ debt-to-asset ratios are about 30 
percent, which is 5 percentage points 
higher than small farms’ debt-to-asset 
ratios.2 
Compared to enterprises operated 
by older farmers, farm enterprises 
operated by producers younger than 
35 years old are more leveraged, 
and they have lower amounts of 
wealth. Younger operators who have 
just started farming often use debt 
to finance the high capital costs of 
agriculture. As a result, the net worth 
of farm enterprises with younger 
operators is about half of their more 
established, older counterparts. In 
addition, the debt-to-asset ratio for 
farm businesses operated by younger 
producers is nearly 15 percentage 
points higher than their more 
seasoned counterparts. 
Thus, of all producer types 
considered, large farms and farms 
operated by younger producers with 
debt are most susceptible to financial 
stress. The debt-to-asset ratio on farms 
with a younger operator averages close 
to 40 percent—a level that has signaled 
significant insolvency risk in the past 
(Melichar).3 In addition, these producers 
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Chart 3
Average Debt-to-Asset Ratio by Producer Type 
Before and After Farmland Value Shocks
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Chart 4
Average Farm Net Worth by Producer Type 
Before and After Farmland Value Shocks
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35 Years Old 
Operators 
Older than 
35 Years Old 
have a higher concentration of non-real 
estate debt. For large farming operations 
and those operated by younger farmers, 
non-real estate debt averages about 20 
percent of total farm debt, compared 
to less than 15 percent for both small 
farm operations and those operated by 
more experienced farmers. 
eFFects  oF  Farmland  Value 
shocks on Farm Balance sheets
A lesson from the 1980s is that 
high debt-to-asset ratios and too much 
non-real estate debt can be a catalyst 
for bankruptcy, especially if farmland 
values drop. A correction in farmland 
markets could slash farm net worth, 
raise debt-to-asset ratios and increase 
the risks of insolvency. However, the 
deterioration of a producer’s balance 
sheet largely depends on the severity 
of the land value decline. 
This analysis estimates how the 
patterns of falling land values in 
the 1980s would affect today’s farm 
balance sheets.  Two scenarios are 
considered.  The first is a 10 percent 
decline in farmland values—the 
steepest one-year decline in land 
values during the 1980s farm crisis. 
The second is a 50 percent decline, 
which equals the persistent decline during 
the decade of the crisis.
If today’s land values were to fall 
10 percent, the impact on debt-to-asset 
ratios and farm net worth would be 
fairly uniform and modest across most 
producers. On average, debt-to-asset ratios 
would not increase significantly (Chart 3). 
Even the most debt-laden producers, large 
farmers and young operators, would see 
their debt-to-asset ratios rise an average of 
only 1.5 percentage points. In addition, 
all producer types would experience a 
7 percent decline in net worth (Chart 
4). As a result, a 10 percent decline in 
land values would only slightly heighten 
insolvency risk. The number of insolvent 
producers with negative net worth would 
increase 0.1 percent. Even for more 
leveraged producers, the increase would 
be 0.2 percent. 
If farmland values were to drop 50 
percent, the effects would be more severe. 
On average, producers would lose 35 
percent of their net worth, erasing recent 
gains and dropping producers’ net worth 
to 2004 levels. Overall, debt-to-asset ratios 
for the farm sector would rise anywhere 
from 5 to 8 percentage points, raising the 
risk of insolvency for many producers. 
Financial stress would be most severe 
for producers with relatively more non-
real estate debt. After a 50 percent decline 
in land values, large farming operations 
and younger operators with significant 
levels of non-real estate debt could see 
their average debt-to-asset ratio reach a dangerously high 40 percent (Chart 
3). The number of large farmers 
facing insolvency could more than 
double, and the number of young 
operators could quadruple. 
ImplIcatIons
The strength of today’s farm 
balance sheets has been buoyed by 
lofty farmland values. If those values 
fell severely, as in the 1980s, many 
farm balance sheets could deteriorate 
rapidly. Net worth could plummet 
and farm debt-to-asset ratios could 
escalate, especially for large farming 
operations and younger operators. 
For these producers, the risk of 
insolvency would be significantly 
higher because of their larger debt 
loads, especially if they are carrying 
high levels of non-real estate debt.
History has demonstrated that 
high debt levels are a concern, but 
high non-real estate debt levels can be 
devastating. During the 1970s, farm 
non-real estate debt surged due in 
part to strong capital investments 
and low variable interest rates. 
But when interest rates rose and 
income dropped in the 1980s, many 
producers could not afford their hefty 
non-real estate debt payment. As a 
result, many filed for bankruptcy.
In today’s low interest rate 
environment, there is evidence that 
non-real estate debt is on the rise. 
With rising farm capital spending, 
the total volume of machinery and 
equipment loans at commercial 
banks was 73 percent above year-
ago levels in the first quarter of 2011 
(Agricultural Finance Databook). 
Further, the Farm Credit System 
reported stronger gains in production 
and intermediate-term loans at the 
end of 2010.
In sum, a high level of non-
real estate debt was an important 
factor in many farm bankruptcies 
when farm incomes and farmland 
values dropped following the 1970s 
farm boom.  Similarly, recent data 
suggest farm non-real estate debt is 
on the rise in the current farm boom.   
The industry’s experience from the 
1980s farm bust suggests that if the 
current run-up in non-real estate 
debt accelerates, the risks for farm 
bankruptcies could intensify should 
farmland values turn down abruptly.
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endnotes
1In the 1980s, when farm income dropped 
and variable interest rates on non-real-
estate loans jumped, these insolvent 
producers did not have the income or net 
worth to service their loans. As a result, 
non-real-estate farm loan delinquency 
rates jumped to record highs. According 
to the earliest data available in the 
Agricultural Finance Databook, more 
than 10 percent of non-real-estate farm 
loans were delinquent in 1987.
2A debt-to-asset ratio of 30 percent is 
similar to other reported ratios for large 
farming operations with more than $1 
million in farm sales. According to data 
from Kansas State University and the 
University of Illinois, large farmers had 
similar debt-to-asset ratios.
3Melichar argues that during the 1980s, if 
a producer’s debt-to-asset ratio rose above 
40 percent they were at the tipping point 
to severe financial stress because if interest 
rates rose, their debt would be too much 
to service. As a result, these producers 
were more likely to file for bankruptcy.
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